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TORTS-INTERFERENCE WITH EMPLOYMENT
OR OCCUPATION, OR INJURY TO BUSINESS:
THE NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT
DEFINITIVELY RECOGNIZES THE TORT
OF UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE WITH BUSINESS
Trade 'N Post, L.L.C. v. World Duty Free Americas, Inc.,
2001 ND 116,628 N.W.2d 707
I. FACTS
Trade 'N Post, a duty-free store in Pembina, North Dakota, brought suit
against its competitor, Ammex, for using anticompetitive practices to drive
it out of business.' In March 1998, Cameron Wilwand and his son, Tim
Wilwand, opened Trade 'N Post next door to Ammex. 2 Ammex is one of a
chain of duty-free stores owned and operated by World Duty Free Ameri-
cas, Inc. and Ammex Tax and Duty Free Shops West, Inc. (Ammex). 3
Ammex opened its first store in Pembina in 1989 and then purchased its
only competitor in that market in 1993.4 Ammex maintained this local
monopoly until March 1998, when Trade 'N Post opened.5
Trade 'N Post claimed that Ammex employees threatened to put Trade
'N Post out of business while the store was still being built.6 Trade 'N Post
also claimed that Ammex slashed its prices to below cost, charged less for
items at its Pembina store than at its other North Dakota stores, pressured
alcohol and tobacco suppliers not to do business with Trade 'N Post, and
tried to discourage tour bus operators from stopping at Trade 'N Post with
their passengers. 7
On May 12, 1999, Trade 'N Post filed suit in the United States District
Court for the District of North Dakota alleging that Ammex violated state
1. Trade 'N Post, L.L.C. v. World Duty Free Ams., Inc., 2001 ND 116, [ 3, 628 N.W.2d
707, 708-09.
2. Brief for Appellant at 4, Trade 'N Post, L.L.C. v. World Duty Free Ams., Inc., 2001 ND
116, 628 N.W.2d 707 (No. 20000176).
3. Trade 'N Post, 3, 628 N.W.2d at 708.
4. Appellant's Brief at 5, Trade 'N Post (No. 20000176). Ammex purchased its competitor,
Happy Harry's, for around $7,500,000. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 5-6. Trade 'N Post claimed that managers from other Ammex stores threatened "that
Ammex would do everything in its power to run Trade 'N Post out of business" and "that there
would be a 'blood bath,' and 'it will be [Trade 'N Post's] blood."' Id.
7. Trade 'N Post, 9 3, 628 N.W.2d at 709.
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and federal antitrust laws, North Dakota's Unfair Trade Practices Law,8 and
North Dakota's Unfair Discrimination Law. 9 Trade 'N Post also alleged
that Ammex committed the common law tort of unlawful interference with
business.10 Ammex moved for dismissal."I On October 5, 1999, the district
court ruled that the state and federal antitrust claims could proceed, but it
dismissed the remaining state law claims without prejudice.12 The court
ordered Trade 'N Post to amend its complaint to conform with the court's
order.13 Trade 'N Post amended its complaint to exclusively address the
antitrust issues, and Ammex then filed another motion to dismiss that was
denied on June 1, 2000.14
On November 23, 1999, Trade 'N Post filed suit against Ammex in
Pembina County District Court asserting the state claims that were dis-
missed in federal court. 15 On December 14, 1999, Ammex removed the
case to federal court and again moved for dismissal.16 Ammex then moved
to have the federal and state cases consolidated into one action.17 On
8. Unfair Trade Practices Law, N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-10-05 (1999). Section 5 of the Unfair
Trade Practices Law states:
Any retailer or wholesaler who shall advertise, offer to sell, or sell any article of
merchandise at less than cost to such retailer or wholesaler as defined in this chapter,
or who gives, offers to give, or advertises the intent to give away any article or mer-
chandise, with the intent, or with the effect of injuring competitors and destroying
competition, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
Id.
9. Trade 'N Post, J 4, 628 N.W.2d at 709. Section 1 of the Unfair Discrimination Law
states:
Any person, firm, company, association, corporation, or limited liability company,
foreign or domestic, doing business in this state and engaged in the production, manu-
facture, or distribution of any commodity in general use, that, for the purpose of
destroying the business of a competitor in any locality, intentionally shall discriminate
between different sections, communities, or cities of this state by selling such com-
modity at a lower rate in one section, community, or city than is charged therefor by
said party in another section, community, or city .... is guilty of unfair discrimination.
Unfair Discrimination Law, N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-09-01 (1999).
10. Trade 'N Post, 4, 628 N.W.2d at 709.
11. Brief for Appellant at 2, Trade 'N Post, L.L.C. v. World Duty Free Ams., Inc., 2001 ND
116, 628 N.W.2d 707 (No. 20000176).
12. Id. at 2-3. The court refused to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining
state law claims because they involved novel state law issues that the North Dakota Supreme
Court should decide. Id. The court dismissed the state claims of price discrimination, unfair trade
practices, and unlawful interference with business. Id.
13. Id. at 2.
14. Id. at 3.
15. Id. The complaint alleged state law claims for unfair discrimination, unfair trade prac-
tices, and wrongful interference with business. Id. These claims were brought in state court
because the federal district court had refused to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over these
claims and dismissed them. Id. at 2-3.
16. Id. at 3. This brought the same state law claims before the federal district court that the
court had earlier dismissed without prejudice. Id.
17. Id. This motion was unopposed. Id.
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February 16, 2000, the federal district court granted Ammex's motion and
consolidated the state and federal cases. 18 Trade 'N Post then moved to cer-
tify the three questions concerning North Dakota law to the North Dakota
Supreme Court.19 On June 13, 2000, the district court granted the motion
and filed its certification order with the North Dakota Supreme Court on
June 16, 2000.20
The order certified three questions to the North Dakota Supreme
Court. 21 The third certified question, and the focus of this comment, asked
whether North Dakota recognizes the common law tort of unlawful inter-
ference with business.22 The court answered this question in the affirmative
and held that North Dakota common law recognizes this tort.23
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Nearly every jurisdiction in the United States recognizes two principle
torts that provide claims against activities that interfere with economic
relations. 24  These are known as the interference torts.25  The first is
18. Id.
19. Id. A certified question is a question concerning a point of law that a United States court
of appeals presents to the United States Supreme Court or a state supreme court for clarification.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 220 (7th ed. 1999).
20. Brief for Appellant at 3, Trade 'N Post, L.L.C. v. World Duty Free Ams., Inc., 2001 ND
116, 628 N.W.2d 707 (No. 20000176). Trade 'N Post and Ammex submitted a joint suggestion to
the court concerning the wording of the three questions. Id. The district court examined the joint
proposal and issued its certification order. Id.
21. Trade 'N Post, L.L.C. v. World Duty Free Ams., Inc., 2001 ND 116, g 1, 628 N.W.2d
707, 708. The first certified question asked whether a private right of action for money damages
exists under North Dakota's Unfair Discrimination Law. Id. This question was directed at the
specific alleged facts of the case, but the North Dakota Supreme Court answered that no such
action exists in general. Id. 9 2. The second certified question asked whether a private fight of
action for money damages exists under North Dakota's Unfair Trade Practices Law. Id. 9 1. This
question was also directed at the specific alleged facts of the case, and the North Dakota Supreme
Court again answered that no such action exists in general. Id. 2.
22. Id. 1 .
23. Id. 2.
24. Alex B. Long, Tortious Interference with Business Relations: "The Other White Meat"
of Employment Law, 84 MINN. L. REV. 863, 868 (2000).
25. See Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 902 P.2d 740, 743 (Cal. 1995)
(referring to the "so-called 'interference torts"' while discussing their history).
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interference with contract,26 and the second is unlawful interference with
business. 27
A. ORIGINS OF THE INTERFERENCE TORTS
The roots of these two torts can be traced back to early Roman law. 28
The head of the Roman household, the paterfamililas, was legally re-
sponsible for relatives, dependents, and slaves.29 As such, the paterfamilias
was the person legally entitled to bring a claim for relief when members of
the household were subjected to violence or insults. 30 This was because
wrongs against a member of the household were considered wrongs against
the paterfamilias.3l
The modern origins of the interference torts emerged from English
common law. 32 In the early fourteenth century, a master could sue for
injury to the master's servant caused by violence. 33 The Ordinance of
Labourers created an additional remedy for a master in 1349.34 This statute
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1979). The Second Restatement states:
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a contract
(except a contract to marry) between another and a third person by inducing or other-
wise causing the third person not to perform the contract, is subject to liability to the
other for the pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the failure of the third person to
perform the contract.
Id.
27. Id. § 766B. The tort of unlawful interference with business is also known as interference
with prospective business advantage or interference with prospective contractual relations. Long,
supra note 24, at 868. The Della Penna court referred to it as interference with prospective
economic relations. Della Penna, 902 P.2d at 743. This article, like the North Dakota Supreme
Court, will refer to the tort as unlawful interference with business. Trade 'N Post, L.L.C. v. World
Duty Free Ams., Inc., 2001 ND 116, 2, 628 N.W.2d 707, 708. The Second Restatement states:
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with another's prospective con-
tractual relation (except a contract to marry) is subject to liability to the other for the
pecuniary harm resulting from loss of the benefits of the relation, whether the inter-
ference consists of inducing or otherwise causing a third person not to enter into or
continue the prospective relation or preventing the other from acquiring or continuing
the prospective relation.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766B.
28. Francis Bowes Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract, 36 HARV. L. REV. 663, 663 (1923).
29. Id.
30. Id. Under later Roman law, some members of the household were allowed to bring
actions directly for harm they suffered. Id.
31. Id.
32. See id. at 665 (noting that English common law recognized a claim for injury done to
one's servant in the early part of the fourteenth century).
33. Id. Claims for injury to a master's servant were based upon the loss of services provided
by the servant. See id. (stating that such claims were not based upon contract, but upon the
relationship between master and servant).
34. Id. The Ordinance of Labourers was enacted to combat the labor shortages caused by the
Great Plague. Id. It required every able-bodied person who was not a craftsman to work as a
laborer. Id.
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made it a criminal offense to entice servants away from their masters. 35
The courts enforced statutory enticement claims and common law claims
for violence against a master's servant under one action of trespass.36 Soon,
the difference between the statutory claim and the common law claim was
lost.37 By the end of the eighteenth century, courts were allowing a com-
mon law claim for the procurement or enticement of a master's servant. 38
Courts had not yet recognized a claim for the procurement of the breach of
a contract. 39 It was not until 1853 that courts began to recognize a claim for
interference with a contract.40
1. Lumley v. Gye Set the Stage for the Modern Claim
of Interference With a Contract
The modem tort claim for interference with contract arose in 1853.41
Most authorities point to Lumley v. Gye,42 an English case, as the beginning
of the interference with contract tort.43 Lumley was the owner of the
Queen's Theatre. 44 He hired opera singer Johanna Wagner to sing at his
theatre for three months. 45 The contract contained a provision that pro-
hibited Wagner from singing at other theatres without Lumley's written
permission.46 Gye, the owner of a competing theatre, induced Wagner to
sing at his theatre without Lumley's approval. 47 Lumley then sued Gye for
35. Id. at 665-66.
36. Id. at 666.
37. Id. Courts originally separated the claims that involved violence from those that did not.
Id. Claims that involved violence were properly brought under the common law, and claims that
did not involve violence were brought under the Ordinance of Labourers. Id.
38. Id. Procurement protected all dependent members of a household, and a claim could also
be brought for procuring a child away from his or her parents or procuring a wife away from her
husband. Id. at 667.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 666-67.
41. Harvey S. Perlman, Interference with Contract and Other Economic Expectancies: A
Clash of Tort and Contract Doctrine, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 61, 63 (1982).
42. 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B. 1853).
43. See Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 902 P.2d 740, 743 (Cal. 1995)
(identifying Lumley as the origin of the interference torts); see also Gary Myers, The Differing
Treatment of Efficiency and Competition in Antitrust and Tortious Interference Law, 77 MINN. L.
REV. 1097, 1120-21 (1993) (stating that the common law principle of tortious interference was
established in Lumley); Perlman, supra note 41, at 63 (noting that in 1853, Lumley established a
tort claim for intentional interference with a contract).
44. Lumley, 118 Eng. Rep. at 752.
45. Id. at 759. The contract stated that Wagner was to perform in operas at Lumley's theatre
from April 15th to July 15th. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 759-60. The complaint alleged that Gye, knowing of the contract, maliciously
induced Wagner to breach the contract while it was in force. Id.
2002]
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interfering with the contract.48 The Queen's Bench affirmed the lower
court's ruling for Lumley and recognized a cause of action for "wrongfully
and maliciously" interfering with a contract.49 The court stated that acting
wrongfully and maliciously was equivalent to acting with notice of the con-
tract's existence.50 This holding was the start of the modem claim for inter-
fering with an existing contract, but over the next forty years, the Queen's
Bench would also come to recognize a claim for unlawful interference with
business.5'
2. Temperton v. Russell Boycotted the Lumley Limitations and
Recognized a Claim for Unlawful Interference With Business
The Lumley holding was expanded in another English case, Temperton
v. Russell,52 when the Queen's Bench held that there was a cause of action
for unlawful interference with business. 53 Temperton was a builder in the
city of Hull.5 4 The Operative Bricklayers' Society was a group of local
bricklayers' unions that passed Rule 9, which prohibited union members
from performing work for builders when that work was outside of the
unions' contracts. 55 Temperton did not follow Rule 9, and the unions took
measures to pressure him to comply. 56
The initial measures by the unions did not work so they increased the
pressure on Temperton by urging his suppliers not to provide him with
materials. 57 Temperton's brother was one of his suppliers, and he continued
to do business with Temperton.58 The unions then attempted to force
Temperton's brother to comply with their rules by passing another rule that
boycotted businesses that dealt with him.59 Temperton's brother sued the
48. Id.
49. Id. at 752-53.
50. Id. (stating that if a person knows a contract exists and interferes with the contract, he or
she can be held liable for damages).
51. Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 902 P.2d 740, 743 (Cal. 1995). The
distinction between the two torts is that unlawful interference with business applies to prospective
contractual relations, while interference with a contract applies to existing contractual relations.
Id.
52. 1 Q.B. 715 (Eng. C.A. 1893).
53. Temperton, I Q.B. at 728.
54. Id. at 716.
55. Id.
56. Id. The unions ordered members not to work for Temperton and fined members that did.
Id.
57. Id. at 716-17.
58. Id. at 717.
59. Id. The rule prohibited union members from using lime that was provided by suppliers
doing business with builders violating Rule 9. Id. Brentano was a man that did business with
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unions, alleging loss of business caused by their actions.60 The jury found
for Temperton's brother, and the Queen's Bench unanimously upheld the
verdict. 61 Lord Esher, speaking for the court, analogized the case to
Lumley:
There was the same kind of injury to the plaintiff. It seems rather
a fine distinction to say that, where a defendant maliciously in-
duces a person not to carry out a contract already made with the
plaintiff and so injures the plaintiff, it is actionable, but where he
injures the plaintiff by maliciously preventing a person from enter-
ing into a contract with the plaintiff, which he would otherwise
have entered into, it is not actionable. 62
This reasoning established the modern tort of unlawful interference
with business.63 It was no longer necessary that there be interference with
an existing contract.64 It was sufficient that prospective contractual rela-
tions existed because the injury in both situations was merely identical. 65
B. EVOLUTION OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF REQUIREMENTS
There has been much confusion and debate concerning the burden of
proof required for the interference torts. 66 The focus on intent in Lumley
and Temperton caused the interference torts to become closely tied with the
intentional torts. 67
1. Prima Facie Tort Theory
The result of the close historical relationship between the interference
torts and the intentional torts was that the interference torts took on the
"pleading and burden of proof requirements of the 'true' intentional torts." 68
This meant that the plaintiff was only required to establish a prima facie
Temperton's brother. Id. at 726. The unions told Brentano that his business would be harmed
because no union members would work with materials provided by Temperton's brother. Id.
60. Id. at 715-16.
61. Id. at 723-35.
62. Id. at 728.
63. See Myers, supra note 43, at 1120-21 (stating that the Temperton court extended the prin-
ciple established in Lumley to include a claim for interference with prospective business relations).
64. Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 902 P.2d 740, 744 (Cal. 1995).
65. Myers, supra note 43, at 1120-21.
66. See Perlman, supra note 41, at 64-65 (stating that there are many areas of debate con-
cerning the legal doctrine of the interference torts, but the most significant disagreements surround
the burden of proof requirements).
67. See Della Penna, 902 P.2d at 744 (noting that legal historians have concluded that the
early focus on intent resulted in the interference torts being closely aligned with the intentional
torts such as battery and false imprisonment).
68. Id.
2002]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
case by showing that the defendant was aware of the economic relation, that
the defendant deliberately interfered with it, and that the plaintiff was in-
jured as a result.69 Under this prima facie theory, if the plaintiff establishes
a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that the
conduct was privileged or justified by a recognized defense.70
The Restatement adopted the prima facie tort theory for both of the
interference torts, stating that a party is liable for damages when that party,
without privilege, purposely caused or induced a third person to breach a
contract with another or caused a third person not to establish or continue
business relations with another.7 1 To determine whether a privilege exists,
one must consider the nature of the interfering conduct, the nature of the
expectancy interfered with, the relations of the parties, the interests the
actions served, and the interests of society.72 These factors are weighed to
determine whether the expected harm is justified.73
The Restatement provides a separate section for the privilege of com-
petition.74 This privilege allows one to purposely cause a third person to
refrain from or discontinue doing business with the actor's competitor if
four conditions have been met.75 First, the business relations must concern
matters involved in the competition between the actor and competitor.76
Second, the actor cannot employ improper means. 77 Third, the actor cannot
intend to illegally restrain the competition. 78 And finally, the actor must be
acting for the purpose of furthering competition with others.79
69. Id.
70. Id. at 745.
71. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 766 (1939).
72. Id. § 767.
73. Id. § 767 cmt. a.
74. Id. § 768.
75. Id.
76. Id. A shoe distributor that induced prospective customers away from a competing shoe
distributor would qualify under the first element. Id. § 768 cmt. d. However, a shoe distributor
that induced a third party not to buy a competing shoe distributor's house would not qualify under
the first element. Id.
77. Id. § 768. The use of physical violence, fraud, civil suits, and criminal prosecutions
would be considered improper under this element. Id. § 768 cmt. e. However, an actor could use
persuasion and some economic pressure. Id. The Restatement gives the example of A and B who
operate competing beer breweries. Id. C operates a saloon in a building that C is leasing from A.
Id. A has the power to terminate the lease at will. Id. C sells both A's beer and B's beer in the
saloon. Id. In this situation, it would not be improper for A to threaten to terminate the lease
unless C stops selling B's beer in the saloon. Id.
78. Id. § 768. This element prohibits violations of anti-trust and unfair competition laws. Id.
§ 768 cmt. g. Thus, actors are not privileged when they interfere with business relations for the
purpose of creating an illegal monopoly. Id.
79. Id. § 768. An actor that interfered with business relations must have been motivated, at
least in part, by competitive interests. Id. § 768 cmt. h. If the actor was motivated wholly by ill-
will or revenge and was not promoting competition, his or her acts were not privileged. Id.
[VOL. 78:513
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The prima facie tort approach is considered the most favorable ap-
proach for the plaintiff because once the plaintiff proves intentional interfer-
ence and injury, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove the interference
was justified.80 This places a heavy burden on the defendant and can chill
legitimate competition. 81 Because of this burden, the prima facie tort
approach has fallen out of favor and is now considered the "old view,"
although some jurisdictions still follow it.82 This dissatisfaction has caused
many states to look for a new approach. 83
2. The Wrongful Conduct Theory
Many jurisdictions have rejected the Restatement's prima facie tort
approach and have instead adopted an approach that focuses on the wrong-
ful nature of the interfering conduct. 84 Early in the 1900s, the Restate-
ment's prima facie tort position came under severe criticism for chilling
competition in the marketplace. 85 Critics argued that the plaintiff's burden
was too easy to meet.86 All that plaintiffs were required to prove was an
intentional act and damage to their business. 87 This low threshold led to the
increased likelihood of lawsuits and potential liability for actions that the
80. See Myers, supra note 43, at 1123 (stating that the prima facie tort approach is very much
on the plaintiffs side of the legal spectrum).
81. Id.
82. Id. Myers lists as examples of jurisdictions that follow the prima facie tort approach:
Thompson v. Allstate Insurance Co., 476 F.2d 746, 748-49 (5th Cir. 1973) (stating that Alabama
follows the prima facie tort approach and does not require a plaintiff to prove that the defendant's
actions were unjustified); Superior Models v. Tolkien Enterprises, 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 876, 879
(D. Del. 1981) (stating that a claim for unlawful interference with business only requires a plain-
tiff to prove that the defendant knowingly interfered with a business relationship or expectancy
and damages resulted); Alyeska Pipeline Services Co. v. Aurora Air Services, 604 P.2d 1090,
1095-96 & n.7 (Alaska 1979) (finding that disproving justification was not a part of the plaintiff's
prima facie case); and Furlev Sales & Associates, Inc., v. North American Automotive Ware-
house, Inc., 325 N.W.2d 20, 25 (Minn. 1982) (stating that the defendant carries the burden of
proving justification in a Minnesota claim for interference with contractual relations). Id. n. 128.
Myers also refers to 2 RUDOLF CALLMAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS;
MONOPOLIES § 9.02 (4th ed. 1982); and W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON
TORTS § 130 (5th ed. 1984), which cite cases from jurisdictions that follow the prima facie tort
approach. Id.
83. See Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 902 P.2d 740, 745-46 (Cal. 1995)
(noting that the dissatisfaction with the prima facie tort approach led to calls for changes that
reached their height around the time of the Second Restatement).
84. See id. at 746-47 (listing jurisdictions that have adopted an approach that requires some
form of independently wrongful conduct).
85. See id. at 745 (restating critics' arguments that the prima facie tort approach could lead to
liability for legitimate business competition); see also Long, supra note 24, at 869 (noting that the
main criticism of the prima facie tort approach is that it requires very little of the plaintiff).
86. Long, supra note 24, at 869.
87. See Della Penna, 902 P.2d at 745 (stating that the plaintiff's initial burden of proof under
the prima facie tort approach only required an intentional act and damages).
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marketplace would regard as legitimate business competition.88 During the
American Law Institute's debate over a proposed draft on tortious inter-
ference, one of its members, Professor Carl Auerbach, suggested "foreign
lawyers reading the Restatement as an original matter would find it
astounding that the whole competitive order of American industry is primafacie illegal."89
The Second Restatement drafters heeded the critics and departed from
the prima facie tort position. 90 The revised rule for unlawful interference
with business provided:
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with another's
prospective contractual relation (except a contract to marry) is sub-
ject to liability to the other for the pecuniary harm resulting from
loss of the benefits of the relation, whether the interference
consists of (a) inducing or otherwise causing a third person not to
enter into or continue the prospective relation or (b) preventing the
other from acquiring or continuing the prospective relation. 91
This rule focuses on whether the interference was improper.92 Determining
this requires balancing the seven factors provided in section 767 of the
Second Restatement.93 These factors are: (1) the nature of the conduct, (2)
the motive behind the conduct, (3) the interests of the party that suffered the
interference, (4) the interests the actions served, (5) the interests of society,
(6) how closely related the actions were to the interference, and (7) the
relations of the parties.94
The Second Restatement focused on "improper" interference and
adopted the seven-factor balancing test described above to avoid taking a
stance on the burden of proof issue.95 The drafters defended this reluctance
by noting the "considerable disagreement on who has the burden of
88. Id.
89. Perlman, supra note 41, at 79 (quoting 46 ALI PROCEEDINGS 201 (1969) (statement of
Professor Carl Auerbach)).
90. Della Penna, 902 P.2d at 745.
91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766B (1979). Unlike the Restatement, the Second
Restatement more clearly distinguished between interference with contract and unlawful inter-
ference with business by providing a separate section for each. Id. §§ 766A-766B. Section 766A
set out the rule for interference with contract and section 766B provided the rule for unlawful
interference with business. Id.
92. Id. § 766B.
93. Id. § 766B cmt. a.
94. Id. § 767.
95. See Della Penna, 902 P.2d at 745 (noting the drafters' reluctance to take a stance on the
burden of proof issue).
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pleading and proving certain matters" and stating, "the law in this area...
is still in a formative stage." 96
Since the Second Restatement, the law of unlawful interference with
business has continued to evolve.97 Courts have been willing to reexamine
the elements of the tort and the parties' burdens of proof.98 The Oregon
Supreme Court case of Top Service Body Shop, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance
Co.99 was a landmark case in this evolution. 0 0 In Top Service, the Oregon
Supreme Court recognized the difficulties of defining the elements of this
tort without conflicting with the competitive activities valued in our
society.Ol The court wanted to create a rule that would provide a claim for
wrongful interference and still allow legitimate competition. 0 2 The court
held:
[A] claim [for unlawful interference with business] is made out
when interference resulting in injury to another is wrongful by
some measure beyond the fact of the interference itself. Defen-
dant's liability may arise from improper motives or from the use of
improper means. They may be wrongful by reason of statute or
other regulation, or a recognized rule of common law, or perhaps
an established standard of a trade or profession. No question of
privilege arises unless the interference would be wrongful but for
the privilege; it becomes an issue only if the acts charged would be
tortious on the part of an unprivileged defendant.1 03
In Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom,104 the Utah Supreme Court
adopted the holding of Top Service.l0 5 It was looking for an alternative that
was better than both the prima facie approach and the Second Restatement's
96. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ch. 37 at 5-6, Introductory Note (1965)).
97. Id. at 746.
98. Id.; see also, e.g., Top Serv. Body Shop, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 582 P.2d 1365, 1371
(Or. 1978) (holding that a claim for unlawful interference requires conduct that was independently
wrongful); Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 304 (Utah 1982) (rejecting the
prima facie tort approach by requiring the plaintiff to prove that the interfering conduct was
improper).
99. 582 P.2d 1365 (Or. 1978).
100. See Della Penna, 902 P.2d at 746 (stating that the Oregon Supreme Court was one of
the state courts that reformed the unlawful interference with business tort); see also Perlman,
supra note 41, at 66 (stating that the Top Service court departed from the traditional approach to
the tort).
101. Top Serv., 582 P.2d at 1368.
102. See id. at 1368-69 (recognizing that a broad definition could create liability for conduct
that is legitimately competitive).
103. Id. at 1371 (footnote omitted).
104. 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982).
105. Leigh Furniture, 657 P.2d at 304.
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approach. 106 The court found that the way the tort had been defined in the
past "require[d] too little of the plaintiff."107 It further found that the prima
facie tort approach was inadequate because it made "actionable all sorts of
contemporary examples of otherwise legitimate persuasion."108 Although it
agreed with the Second Restatement's abolishment of the prima facie tort
approach, the court dismissed the Second Restatement's definition of the
tort as being too complex. 109 The court found the Oregon Supreme Court's
approach was a "middle ground" that was superior because it "require[d]
the plaintiff to allege and prove more than the prima facie tort, but not to
negate all defenses of privilege."' 10
The California Supreme Court, in Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales,
U.S.A., Inc.,"' followed Oregon and Utah by adopting a standard that
required interfering conduct that was independently wrongful.1 2 In Della
Penna, the plaintiff was a car dealer that sold Lexus automobiles, which he
purchased from Toyota.1 3 Toyota required all of its dealers in America to
sign a contract that contained a "no export" clause, which prohibited its
dealers from selling Lexus automobiles outside of the United States.l14
Della Penna violated this clause of the contract and, as a result, Toyota put
his dealership on a list of dealers that were in violation of the "no export"
clause.1 5 It became increasingly difficult for Della Penna to find suppliers
because of this listing.116 Finally, he could find no suppliers at all.117 Della
Penna sued Toyota for violations of state antitrust laws and for unlawful
interference with business.18 The state antitrust law claim was dismissed,
and the jury returned a divided verdict in Toyota's favor on the tort
106. Id.
107. Id. at 303.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 304.
110. Id.
111. 902 P.2d 740 (Cal. 1995).
112. Della Penna, 902 P.2d at 751.
113. Id. at 742. John Della Penna owned Pacific Motors, an automobile wholesaler. Id.
114. Id. Toyota introduced the Lexus in the United States in 1989. Id. The company
planned to introduce the Lexus in Japan only after its introduction in the United States. Id. Toy-
ota feared that a resale market for the Lexus would develop in Japan, and that its American dealers
would re-export the cars back to Japan, harming their network of dealers in the United States. Id.
To prevent this, Toyota included the "no export" clause in its dealership contracts. Id.
115. Id. From 1989 to 1990, Della Penna had made a profitable business out of buying
Lexus automobiles from other dealers in the United States and reselling them in Japan. Id.
116. Id. Della Penna's main source for Lexus automobiles, Lexus of Stevens Creek, stopped
selling to him because of the offenders list. Id.
117. Id.
118. /d.
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claim.1 9 The trial court denied Della Penna's request for a new trial and
Della Penna appealed.120 The appellate court granted a new trial.' 2' The
California Supreme Court then granted Toyota's request for review of the
appellate court's decision.122
While addressing the unlawful interference with business claim, the
California Supreme Court discussed the tort's evolution.123 Over the years,
courts had treated interference with existing contracts and interference with
prospective contracts similarly.124 The Della Penna court stated that this
was not correct and there should be a distinction. 25 More protection should
be afforded to existing contracts because there has been an exchange of
promises between the two parties.126 Less protection should be afforded
when merely prospective contracts exist because the American economic
system promotes competition.127 The court reasoned that in such situations
the rewards and risks of competition are greater.128 The court held that in a
claim for unlawful interference with business, the plaintiff must prove "the
defendant's interference was wrongful 'by some measure beyond the fact of
the interference itself."'129
In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Sturges,130 the Texas Supreme Court also
followed the Top Service approach to unlawful interference with business
by requiring conduct that was independently wrongful.131 Sturges bought a
parcel of land (tract two) in Nederland, Texas, on behalf of a group of
investors. 132 The group planned to lease the land to Fleming Foods, which
was looking for land to build a new store. 33 Wal-Mart operated a store on
the adjacent lot (tract one).' 34 Wal-Mart also had an easement on each tract
119. Id. at 743. The jury was split nine to three in Toyota's favor. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 743-47.
124. See id. at 750-51 (criticizing the view that the two claims should be treated the same).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 751.
129. Id. (quoting Top Serv. Body Shop, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 582 P.2d 1365, 1371 (Or.
1978)).
130. 52 S.W.3d 711 (Tex. 2001).
131. Wal-Mart, 52 S.W.3d at 726.
132. Id. at 713.
133. Id. at 714.
134. Id.
2002]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
of land that gave it the right to approve any improvements or modifications
to the land. 35
After purchasing the property, Sturges sought approval from Wal-Mart
for the construction of the planned Fleming Foods store. 36 He contacted
Wood, a manager in Wal-Mart's property management department, who
told Sturges that Wal-Mart would approve the construction. 37 Shortly
thereafter, Sturges negotiated a non-binding agreement with Fleming Foods
in which Fleming Foods stated its intention to lease tract two. 138
Wood was not aware that Watson, a manager in another Wal-Mart
department, had already hired a realtor named Hudson to purchase tract two
so Wal-Mart could expand its Nederland store. 39 The director of Wal-
Mart's property management department, Fuller, was informed of the situa-
tion. 140 Fuller decided that Hudson should proceed with his attempts to buy
tract two, and he directed Wood to deny Sturges' construction approval
request.141 Hudson then informed Fleming Foods that Wal-Mart wanted to
expand onto tract two and told Fleming Foods that if Wal-Mart could not
expand onto tract two, Wal-Mart would close its store on tract one and
relocate it.142 Fleming Foods then withdrew from the non-binding lease
agreement with Sturges because Fleming Foods wanted its new store to be
located next to a Wal-Mart.143
Sturges and the group of investors then sued Wal-Mart for unlawfully
interfering with the prospective lease agreement. 144 The jury found for the
plaintiffs and awarded actual damages, punitive damages, and attorney
135. Id. at 713. One easement was filed in 1982, and the other was filed in 1988. Id. Wal-
Mart obtained the easements to ensure that any development on the land was done according to a
development plan. Id.
136. Id. at 714. The purchase contract for tract two contained a provision that allowed the
purchasers to rescind the contract if they were unable to lease the land and obtain approval from
Wal-Mart for the construction of the Fleming Foods store. Id. at 713.
137. Id. at 714. Wood told Sturges that Wal-Mart would approve the planned construction
even though she did not have the authority to do so. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. Watson had been assigned to find a way to expand the Nederland store. Id. She
determined that the best way to do this was to expand onto the adjacent lot. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. Sturges and the group of investors then opted out of the purchase contract for tract
two. Id. Wal-Mart purchased tract two several months later and expanded its Nederland store.
Id.
144. Id. The plaintiffs also brought a second claim that alleged Wal-Mart breached its ease-
ment contracts by unreasonably refusing to approve the construction project on tract two. Id. at
714-15.
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fees. 145 The trial court then entered judgment without awarding the attor-
ney fees. 146 On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the actual damages but
ordered a retrial of the punitive damages. 47 The Texas Supreme Court then
granted Wal-Mart's petition for review. 148
The Texas Supreme Court held that a plaintiff claiming unlawful inter-
ference with business must prove that the interfering conduct was independ-
ently tortious or wrongful.149 The court explained that a plaintiff was not
required to prove an independent tort, but must be able to prove that the
interfering conduct "would be actionable under a recognized tort."150 The
court found that the defenses of justification and privilege were only
effective to the point that they would be effective against the tortiousness of
the alleged conduct.15' The court reasoned that allowing these defenses was
necessary so that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the conduct
was not justified.152
The Top Service approach has been followed by Utah, California, and
Texas, and has gained acceptance throughout the country.153 Many states
have adopted this approach with slight variations while maintaining the
basic requirement that the plaintiff prove the interfering conduct was in
some respect independently wrongful. 54 The current trend in the law is
toward more widespread acceptance of this approachS5
Until 2001, North Dakota had not joined the group of states that have
adopted variations of the Top Service approach.156 In fact, it was not clear
145. Id. at 715. The jury found for the plaintiffs on both the unlawful interference claim and
the contract claim. Id. The jury awarded the plaintiffs $1,000,000 in actual damages, $500,000 in
punitive damages on the unlawful interference claim, and $145,000 in attorney fees. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. The court of appeals found that the trial court had improperly excluded evidence for
the plaintiffs that concerned punitive damages. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 726.
150. Id. The court gave the example of a plaintiff that brought a claim for unlawful inter-
ference with business against a defendant for making fraudulent statements about the plaintiff to a
third person. Id. In such a situation, the plaintiff could recover without proving that fraud was
actually committed. Id.
151. Id. at 726-27.
152. Id.
153. See Trade 'N Post, L.L.C. v. World Duty Free Ams., Inc., 2001 ND 116, 42, 628
N.W.2d 707, 719 (stating that an increasing number of jurisdictions have been requiring indepen-
dently tortious or unlawful conduct in a claim for unlawful interference with business).
154. Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 902 P.2d 740, 746-47 (Cal. 1995) (ob-
serving that nearly a majority of states have required some form of wrongful conduct as required
in Top Service).
155. See Trade 'N Post, 42, 628 N.W.2d at 719 (stating that the number of jurisdictions
adopting this approach is growing).
156. Id. 91 34, 628 N.W.2d at 716.
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whether North Dakota common law even recognized a claim for unlawful
interference with business. 157
C. UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE WITH BUSINESS IN NORTH DAKOTA
Although the North Dakota Supreme Court had heard cases dealing
with unlawful interference with business claims in the past, it had not made
a definitive ruling on whether North Dakota common law recognizes the
tort.158 One reason for this may be that the issue had come before the court
very few times.159
Fox v. Higgins'60 was the first case to present the issue to the court.161
Fox was a farmer and rancher who sued Higgins for unlawful interference
with business.162 Fox claimed that Higgins committed various tortious acts
against him in an attempt to intentionally and maliciously destroy his busi-
ness. 163 The statutes of limitation had run on each of the individual torts
Fox alleged. 164 To get around the statutes of limitation, Fox sued Higgins
under the theory that the various tortious acts constituted a continuing tort
of unlawful interference with business.165 The court did not decide whether
North Dakota recognized a cause of action for unlawful interference with
business, but instead, it held that Fox had not sufficiently pleaded and
proven the necessary elements of the tort.166
The next time the issue came before the court was in Schneider v.
Schaaf.167 The Schneiders were an elderly couple who owned a small farm
in Stark County, North Dakota.168 In 1982, they leased 380 acres of their
157. Id.
158. Id. at 716.
159. See id. at 716-17 (citing Fox v. Higgins, 149 N.W.2d 369, 371 (N.D. 1967); Schneider
v. Schaaf, 1999 ND 235, 1[9 25-28, 603 N.W.2d 869, 876-77; Fargo Women's Health Org., Inc. v.
FM Women's Help & Caring Connection, 444 N.W.2d 683, 687-88 (N.D. 1989) (VandeWalle, J.,
concurring in result)).
160. 149 N.W.2d 369 (N.D. 1967).
161. Fox, 149 N.W.2d at 371.
162. Id. at 370.
163. Id. at 370-71. Fox alleged that Higgins committed "arson, assault with a deadly weap-
on, barratry, champerty and maintenance, the purchase of a pretended title, abuse of process,
malicious mischief, [and] false arrest and imprisonment." Id. at 371.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 372. The court wrote:
Our decision does not, as contended by the plaintiff, mean that no right of action exists
in this State for interference with business or trade. All that we do hold is that the
pleading of the plaintiff and the evidence which he produced in this case do not
constitute or prove such a tort.
Id. (deciding to decline the petition for rehearing).
167. Schneider v. Schaaf, 1999 ND 235, 25, 603 N.W.2d 869, 876.
168. Id. 1 2, 603 N.W.2d at 872.
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land to Michael Schaaf to farm.169 After several extensions to the lease, the
Schneiders wanted to put their land in the Conservation Reserve Program
(CRP) starting in 1990.170 Schaaf resisted and claimed that he had leased
the land through 1990.171
The Schneiders sued, claiming that Schaaf was trying to drive them out
of farming. 72 They claimed breach of contract, unlawful interference with
business, and other tortious acts.1 73 The North Dakota Supreme Court up-
held the trial court's granting of summary judgment to dismiss the tort
claims. 174 The court did not decide whether North Dakota recognized the
tort of unlawful interference with business but simply held that dismissal of
the claim was appropriate because the Schneiders had not proven actual
damages. 175
The court again declined to clearly state whether North Dakota recog-
nized the tort.176 Schneider was decided in December 1999 and left open
the question of whether North Dakota common law recognized the tort of
unlawful interference with business.177
D. SUMMARY OF LEGAL BACKGROUND
The modem tort claim for interference with an existing contract began
in 1853 with the English case of Lumley.' 78 In 1893, Temperton extended
the Lumley holding and recognized a claim for unlawful interference with
business.179 There are two principal burden of proof theories for an unlaw-
ful interference with business claim.180 The first theory is the prima facie
theory.181 Under this approach, if the plaintiff proves that the defendant
intentionally interfered with economic relations, and injury resulted, the
169. Id. The terms of the original lease were from March 1, 1982, to October 15, 1984, at
eighteen dollars an acre per year. Id.
170. Id. 4-5. Extensions were made to the lease, but they were poorly documented and
confusing. Id. [ 4. The CRP paid thirty-five dollars per acre. Id. 5.
171. Id. 91 7, 603 N.W.2d at 873. Schaaf claimed that he signed a lease extension agreement
that gave him rights to the land through 1990, but the Schneiders claimed it was fraudulent. Id.
15, 603 N.W.2d at 874.
172. Id. 9, 603 N.W.2d at 873.
173. Id. 9-11. The Schneiders sued for fraud, "illegal acts in concert with each other,"
unlawful interference with business, and civil rights violations. Id. 9111.
174. Id. E 36, 603 N.W.2d at 878.
175. Id. 27-28, 603 N.W.2d at 876-77.
176. Id. 25-28.
177. Id.
178. See supra Part .A.1.
179. Temperton v. Russell, 1 Q.B. 715, 728 (Eng. C.A. 1893).
180. See Long, supra note 24, at 868-69 (summarizing the prima facie theory and the
wrongful conduct theory).
181. RESTATEMENT OFTORTS § 766 (1939).
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burden shifts to the defendant to prove that the interfering conduct was
privileged.182 The prima facie theory has fallen out of favor because the
heavy burden it places on the defendant can chill legitimate competition. 183
The second theory is the wrongful conduct theory. 84 This approach
focuses on whether the interfering conduct was improper.185 In Top Ser-
vice, the Oregon Supreme Court modified the wrongful conduct theory by
requiring conduct that was wrongful, independent of the interference it-
self.' 86 This was seen as an improvement because it required the plaintiff to
prove more than the prima facie elements but did not negate all defenses of
privilege. 187
Many states have adopted a variation of the Top Service approach
because of its increased protections for legitimate competition. 88 The trend
in recent years has been toward further adoption of the Top Service ap-
proach.' 89 The North Dakota Supreme Court recognized this trend when it
decided which theory North Dakota would follow. 190
III. ANALYSIS
The North Dakota Supreme Court decided Trade 'N Post unanimous-
ly.191 Justice Sandstrom wrote the court's opinion.192 The court answered
three certified questions in the opinion. 93 This case comment focuses on
the third certified question, whether North Dakota common law recognized
the tort of unlawful interference with business. 194 The court held that North
182. Long, supra note 24, at 868.
183. Myers, supra note 43, at 1123.
184. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766B (1979).
185. Id.
186. Top Serv. Body Shop, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 582 P.2d 1365, 1371 (Or. 1978).
187. Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 304 (Utah 1982).
188. See Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 902 P.2d 740, 746-47 (listing
jurisdictions that have adopted an approach requiring some form of independently wrongful
conduct).
189. See Trade 'N Post, L.L.C. v. World Duty Free Ams., Inc., 2001 ND 116, 9 40-42, 628
N.W.2d 707, 718-19 (noting the "growing body of cases" adopting the Top Service approach).
190. Id. 42, 628 N.W.2d at 719.
191. Id. 91 46, 628 N.W.2d at 721. District Judge Gerald H. Rustad sat in place of Justice
Kapsner who was disqualified from the case. Id. 47.
192. Id. 1,628 N.W.2d at 708.
193. Id. 1 1-2. The first certified question asked whether a private right of action for
money damages exists under North Dakota's Unfair Discrimination Law. Id. The court held no
such action exists. Id. 2. The second certified question asked whether a private right of action
for money damages exists under North Dakota's Unfair Trade Practices Law. Id. 1 1. The court
again held that no such action exists. Id. 2.
194. Id. 1.
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Dakota does recognize a common law claim for unlawful interference with
business. 195
The court began its analysis of this issue by noting that it has recog-
nized a claim for the related tort of interference with an existing contract. 96
A third party who wrongfully interferes with a contract, or prevents the for-
mation of a contract, can be held liable for damages. 197 The court discussed
interference with an existing contract because it is closely related to a claim
for unlawful interference with business. 198
The court then moved to unlawful interference with business. 199 Al-
though the court had addressed the issue in previous cases, it had not made
a definitive ruling on whether the tort was recognized under North Dakota
common law.200 To illustrate this, the court pointed to several cases.20
First, the court cited Fox in which it was presented with an unlawful inter-
ference with business claim. 202 In Fox, the court did not decide whether
North Dakota recognized a claim for unlawful interference with business. 203
The court instead dismissed the suit, holding that even if such a claim
existed, the plaintiff's pleadings and proof were not adequate. 204
Second, the court cited Schneider in which it upheld the summary judg-
ment dismissal of an unlawful interference with business claim because the
plaintiff failed to prove damages. 205 However, the court did not definitively
rule on the existence of the tort in North Dakota.06
195. Id. 9 2.
196. See id. 33, 628 N.W.2d at 716 (citing Messiha v. State, 1998 ND 149, 10, 583
N.W.2d 385, 388 (stating that a prima facie case for tortious interference with a contract requires
"a breach of contract instigated without justification by the defendant"); Tracy v. Cent. Cass Pub.
Sch. Dist., 1998 ND 12, 9, 574 N.W.2d 781, 782-83 (stating that a prima facie case for inter-
ference with a contract requires a plaintiff to prove that a contract existed, that the contract was
breached, and that the defendant instigated the breach without justification); Fronteer Directory
Co. v. Maley, 1997 ND 162, 14, 567 N.W.2d 826, 829 (stating that the existence of a contract
and a breach of a contract are the first two elements of a claim for interference with a contract)).
197. Trade 'N Post, L.L.C. v. World Duty Free Ams., Inc., 2001 ND 116, 33, 628 N.W.2d
707, 716. "Wrongful interference with contractual rights, whether such interference induces or
prevents a third person to refrain from forming a contract, or induces such person to break an
existing contract, will render the person whose wrongful conduct is responsible for these results
liable in damages to the party injured." Id. (quoting Bekken v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of
U.S., 293 N.W. 200, 217 (N.D. 1940)).
198. See id. (noting that the two claims are closely related).
199. Id. 33-34.
200. Id. (R 34. The court noted that it had not definitively ruled on the tort's existence before
Trade 'N Post. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
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Finally, the court cited Chief Justice VandeWalle's concurring opinion
in Fargo Women's Health Organization Inc. v. FM Women's Help &
Caring Connection.2 7 Justice VandeWalle wrote that, although it was not
pleaded, the appellee could possibly have brought a claim for unlawful
interference with business. 208 This statement again lacked a clear pro-
nouncement by the court regarding the recognition of the tort in North
Dakota.2 09
The court then reiterated its definitive recognition of a claim for unlaw-
ful interference with business in North Dakota. 2 10 The court next defined
its required elements.2 11 To establish a claim for unlawful interference with
business in North Dakota, a plaintiff must prove the following elements: (1)
there was a valid business relationship or expectancy, (2) the interfering
party knew of the relationship or expectancy, (3) the interfering conduct
was independently tortious or otherwise unlawful, (4) the claimed damages
were caused by the act, and (5) the party claiming the interference suffered
actual damages.2 12
Realizing the third element, that the interfering conduct was indepen-
dently tortious or otherwise unlawful, required further explanation, the
court addressed it in-depth.2 13 The court recognized that there has been
much controversy concerning what constitutes an independently tortious or
otherwise unlawful act. 214 The court noted that the major area of disagree-
ment was whether the motive behind the interfering actions should be rele-
vant. 2 15 The court further noted that many courts and commentators have
argued that, in the context of business competitors, the motive or intent of
the interfering party is irrelevant and the determining factor should be
whether the actions were "independently tortious or unlawful." 216 The
207. Id. (citing Fargo Women's Health Org., Inc. v. FM Women's Help & Caring
Connection, 444 N.W.2d 683, 687-88 (N.D. 1989) (VandeWalle, J., concurring in result)).
208. Fargo Women's Health, 444 N.W.2d at 687-88. In Fargo Women's Health, the appel-
lee's award of compensatory and punitive damages for violation of the false advertising statute
was upheld over the appellant's claim that remedies under the statute were limited to criminal
penalties and injunctive relief. Id. at 686.
209. See id. at 687-88 (stating that such a claim could be brought, but not stating whether the
court would find the claim valid).
210. Trade 'N Post, L.L.C. v. World Duty Free Ams., Inc., 2001 ND 116, 35, 628 N.W.2d
707, 717.
211. Id. 9136.
212. Id.
213. See id. 37 (noting that there are many different views about what conduct is
actionable under this tort).
214. Id.
215. Id. 9[ 38.
216. Id. 9 39, 628 N.W.2d at 718 (citing Speakers of Sport, Inc. v. ProServ, Inc., 178 F.3d
862, 867 (7th Cir. 1999); Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 902 P.2d 740, 750-51
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court agreed with the Della Penna holding, which required the interfering
conduct to be "wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the
interference itself."217
The North Dakota Supreme Court then looked to Professor Gary Myers
for further guidance on this issue.218 Professor Myers argued that in the
United States economic system, which puts great value on competition,
motive should not be considered. 219 He argued that if motive was the defin-
ing factor, every competitor would be a tortfeasor because every business
competitor would in some way have economic self-interest as a motive
when interfering with business relations.220 Professor Myers concluded that
this was not acceptable in an economic system that rewards those who gain
an advantage over their competitors. 22'
The court applied this analysis to the claim in Trade 'N Post and held
that to recover for unlawful interference with business in North Dakota, the
plaintiff must prove that the interfering conduct was "independently tortious
or otherwise unlawful." 222 To support its holding, the court adopted the
Texas Supreme Court's reasoning in Wal-Mart Stores.223 The court quoted
a passage from Wal-Mart in which the Texas Supreme Court laid out its
approach to a claim for unlawful interference with business. 224 The Wal-
Mart court held that a claim for unlawful interference with business re-
quired an act that was independently tortious or wrongful. 225 However, this
does not mean the plaintiff must be able to prove an independent tort.226 It
simply means the plaintiff must be able to prove the interfering act was
tortious under recognized law.227
(Cal. 1995); Vikings, U.S.A. Bootheel Mo. v. Modem Day Veterans, 33 S.W.3d 709, 711 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2000); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Sturges, 52 S.W.3d 711, 713 (Tex. 2001); Dan B. Dobbs,
Tortious Interference with Contractual Relationships, 34 ARK. L. REV. 335, 347-50 (1980);
Myers, supra note 43, at 1142-43; Perlman, supra note 41, at 78-99).
217. Id. 40, 628 N.W.2d at 719 (quoting Della Penna, 902 P.2d at 751).
218. Id. [ 41. Professor Myers is an assistant professor of law at the University of Mississip-
pi and the author of The Differing Treatment of Efficiency and Competition in Antitrust and
Tortious Interference Law, which was published in the Minnesota Law Review. Myers, supra note
43, at 1097 n.a.
219. Myers, supra note 43, at 1142.
220. Trade 'N Post, L.L.C. v. World Duty Free Ams., Inc., 2001 ND 116, 9 41, 628 N.W.2d
707, 719 (quoting Myers, supra note 43, at 1142).
221. See id. (quoting Myers, supra note 43, at 1142 (stating that economic competitors
should not be liable in tort for legitimate competition in a free market system)).
222. Id. 42.
223. Id. at 719-21 (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Sturges, 52 S.W.3d 711, 726-27 (Tex.
2001)).
224. Id.
225. Id. at 720 (quoting Wal-Mart, 52 S.W.3d at 726).
226. Id. (quoting Wal-Mart, 52 S.W.3d at 726).
227. Id. (quoting Wal-Mart, 52 S.W.3d at 726).
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The North Dakota Supreme Court quoted examples that the Wal-Mart
court used to illustrate how a plaintiff could succeed in proving that inter-
fering conduct was independently tortious or wrongful without proving an
independent tort. 228 One example involved potential customers of a plain-
tiff who were kept away from the plaintiff's business by threats of physical
harm.229 The plaintiff in this example would have a claim for unlawful
interference with business if he or she could prove the conduct constituted
assault.230 The plaintiff would not need to prove the potential customers
were assaulted.231
Another example involved a business that was being boycotted. 232 The
business in this example would have a claim for unlawful interference with
business if it could show the boycott was illegal.233 It would not have a
claim if the boycott was legal because conduct that is "merely 'sharp' or
unfair is not actionable and cannot be the basis for tortious interference." 234
The North Dakota Supreme Court further quoted the Wal-Mart court,
stating that a claim for unlawful interference with business was necessary to
fill a gap in tort law. 235 The plaintiff in the first example above, although
economically injured, could not sue for assault because he or she was not
threatened. 236 The plaintiff would have no remedy at all without the tort of
unlawful interference with business.237 This tort would provide a remedy if
the interfering conduct was "recognized as wrongful under the common law
or by statute." 238
The North Dakota Supreme Court adopted the Wal-Mart court's ap-
proach to possible defenses to unlawful interference with business.239 The
Wal-Mart court stated that the defenses of justification and privilege would
be effective only inasmuch as they would be effective against the indepen-
dent tortiousness of the interfering conduct. 240 Thus, if a plaintiff brings a
claim for unlawful interference caused by defamation, the defendant may
228. Id. (quoting Wal-Mart, 52 S.W.3d at 726).
229. Id. (quoting Wal-Mart, 52 S.W.3d at 726).
230. Id. (quoting Wal-Mart, 52 S.W.3d at 726).
231. Id. (quoting Wal-Mart, 52 S.W.3d at 726).
232. Id. (quoting Wal-Mart, 52 S.W.3d at 726).
233. Id. (quoting Wal-Mart, 52 S.W.3d at 726).
234. Id. (quoting Wal-Mart, 52 S.W.3d at 726).
235. Id. at 721 (quoting Wal-Mart, 52 S.W.3d at 713).
236. Id. (quoting Wal-Mart, 52 S.W.3d at 713).
237. See id. (quoting Wal-Mart, 52 S.W.3d at 713 (stating that the plaintiff would not have a
claim for assault)).
238. Id. (quoting Wal-Mart, 52 S.W.3d at 713).
239. Id. at 720.
240. Id. (quoting Wal-Mart, 52 S.W.3d at 726-27).
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bring a defense of privilege. 241 If a defense does not relate to the tortious-
ness of the conduct, the defendant cannot assert it, and the plaintiff does not
need to disprove it.242
The North Dakota Supreme Court definitively recognized a common
law claim for unlawful interference with business and adopted the Wal-
Mart court's analysis concerning the required elements of the tort and the
character of the interfering conduct. 243 The court held that a plaintiff in a
claim for unlawful interference with business must prove that the interfer-
ing conduct was conduct that was tortious by itself or against state law. 244
IV. IMPACT
The North Dakota Supreme Court's express recognition of the tort of
unlawful interference with business gave North Dakota lawyers a clear
ruling on the tort's existence in North Dakota.245 Before Trade 'N Post, the
court had decided cases that brought claims under the tort, but it had not
clearly addressed the validity of such claims.246 The court defined the
elements of the tort and discussed the types of interfering actions that are
actionable under it.247 Lawyers practicing before North Dakota courts can
now bring claims for unlawful interference with business with confidence
in the claims' validity and knowledge of the elements they must prove. 248
The recognition of a claim for unlawful interference with business fills
a gap in North Dakota tort law. 249 Situations exist where an injured party
would likely have no claim for relief without the tort.250 Business owners
can now obtain a remedy for economic damages when relations with their
potential customers have been interfered with by conduct that is indepen-
241. Id. (quoting Wal-Mart, 52 S.W.3d at 727).
242. Id. (quoting Wal-Mart, 52 S.W.3d at 727).
243. Id. 191 42-43, 628 N.W.2d at 719-21.
244. Id. 9[ 43,628 N.W.2d at 721.
245. See id. 91 34, 628 N.W.2d at 716 (noting that the court had decided cases involving the
tort, but had not expressly recognized its validity in North Dakota).
246. Id.
247. Id. 9191 36-42, 628 N.W.2d at 717-21. The five elements are: (1) there existed a valid
business relationship or expectancy, (2) the interfering party knew of the relationship or expectan-
cy, (3) the interfering conduct was independently tortious or otherwise unlawful, (4) the claimed
damages were caused by the act, and (5) the party claiming the interference suffered actual
damages. Id. 91 36, 628 N.W.2d at 717.
248. See id. 91 35-42, 628 N.W.2d at 717-21 (recognizing the tort in North Dakota and
defining its elements).
249. See id. 91 42, 628 N.W.2d at 721 (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Sturges, 52 S.W.3d
711, 713 (Tex. 2001) (stating that a claim for unlawful interference with business provides a
remedy where other claims will not)).
250. Id. (quoting Wal-Mart, 52 S.W.3d at 713).
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dently tortious or in violation of state law. 251 Without the tort of unlawful
interference with business, such business owners could not obtain a remedy
without an existing contract or business relationship. 252
The tort also provides a remedy for businesses that have been harmed
by independently tortious or unlawful conduct that was not directed at the
business, but at third persons. 253 A business owner now has a claim for
relief if customers are driven away by physical threats.254 Without an un-
lawful interference with business claim, the business owner had no remedy
because the owner was not being threatened and thus could not sue for
assault. 255
The tort may also provide alternate or companion claims in certain
suits.2 56 Plaintiffs have brought unlawful interference with business claims
as companions to antitrust claims. 257 They have also brought interference
claims as companions to wrongful discharge claims. 258 The plaintiff in
Trade 'N Post demonstrated these possibilities by bringing an interference
claim as a companion to its antitrust claims.259
This tort also provides an alternative to claims based on the tortious
acts themselves. 260 Plaintiffs can bring claims based on the interfering
impact that actions had on prospective business relations. 261 This is an
effective alternative because courts have been reluctant to award purely
economic damages under traditional intentional torts and negligence
251. See id. 9 43 (defining culpable conduct under the tort).
252. See Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 902 P.2d 740, 750-51 (recognizing
the distinction between contractual relations and prospective contractual relations).
253. See Trade 'N Post, L.L.C. v. World Duty Free Ams., Inc., 2001 ND 116, 42, 628
N.W.2d 707, 721 (quoting Wal-Mart, 52 S.W.3d at 713 (stating that unlawful interference with
business provides a claim in some circumstances where otherwise a claim would not exist)).
254. Id. (quoting Wal-Mart, 52 S.W.3d at 713).
255. See id. (quoting Wal-Mart, 52 S.W.3d at 713 (stating that a business owner cannot sue
for assault when customers are physically threatened)).
256. See, e.g., id. 4, 628 N.W.2d at 709 (bringing a claim for unlawful interference with
business along with antitrust and unfair trade practices claims); see also Long, supra note 24,
at 874-75 (stating that an interference claim is a natural companion to a wrongful discharge
claim); Myers, supra note 43, at 1099 (stating that plaintiffs in antitrust suits bring companion
interference claims).
257. Myers, supra note 43, at 1099.
258. See Long, supra note 24, at 874-75 (stating that an unlawful interference with business
claim could be brought with a wrongful discharge claim).
259. Trade 'N Post, L.L.C. v. World Duty Free Ams., Inc., 2001 ND 116, 7 4, 628 N.W.2d
707, 709.
260. Perlman, supra note 41, at 69.
261. Id. For example, if the plaintiff had a prospective contract with a third party that the
defendant interfered with by fraud, the plaintiff could sue for fraud and for unlawful interference
with business. See id. (using an example involving interference with an existing contract).
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claims. 262 Thus, a plaintiff seeking purely economic damages for interfer-
ence caused by tortious acts may have a better chance for recovery under an
alternative claim for unlawful interference with business. 263
V. CONCLUSION
In Trade 'N Post, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that North
Dakota common law recognizes the tort of unlawful interference with busi-
ness. 264 The court also set forth the five elements that a plaintiff must prove
in order to establish the tort: (1) the existence of a valid business relation-
ship or expectancy, (2) the interfering party knew of the relationship or
expectancy, (3) the interfering conduct was independently tortious or other-
wise unlawful, (4) the claimed damages were caused by the act, and (5) the
party claiming the interference suffered actual damages.265
Joseph A. Heringer
262. Id. The justification for this is that purely economic damages are more remote or
unforeseeable. Id. at 70.
263. See id. (stating that purely economic damages are difficult to obtain under the
traditional intentional torts).
264. Trade 'N Post, 32, 628 N.W.2d at 716.
265. Id. ( 36, 628 N.W.2d at 717.
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